Traditional methods in public key cryptography are based on number theory, and suffer from problems such as dealing with very large numbers, making key creation cumbersome. Here, we propose a new public key cryptosystem based on strings only, which avoids the difficulties of the traditional number theory approach. The security mechanism for public and secret keys generation is ensured by a recursive encoding mechanism embedded in a quasi-commutativerandom function, resulted from the composition of a quasi-commutative function with a pseudorandom function. Due to the inherent construction algorithm of the the proposed cryptosystem, the resulted mathematical inversion problem is likely to be harder than the classical discrete logarithm or integer factorization problems. Furthermore, the proposed cryptosystem is immune against the known quantum algorithm attacks.
Introduction
In a symmetrical key cryptosystem [1] , such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), two users Alice and Bob must first agree on a common secret key. If Alice communicates the secret key to Bob, a third party, Eve, might intercept the key, and decrypt the messages. In order to avoid such a situation Alice and Bob can use an asymmetric public key cryptosystem [1] , which provides a secure mechanism to exchange information between two users.
In public key cryptography each user has a pair of cryptographic keys, consisting of a public key and a secret private key. These keys are related through a hard mathematical inversion problem, such that the private key cannot be practically derived from the public key.
The two main directions of public key cryptography are the public key encryption and the digital signatures. Public key encryption is used to ensure confidentiality. In this case, the data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key, and vice versa. Digital signatures are used to ensure authenticity. In this case, any message signed with a user's private key can be verified by anyone having the user's public key, proving the authenticity of the message.
A standard implementation of public key cryptography is based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol [2] . The protocol allows two users to exchange a secret key over an insecure communication channel. The platform of the DH protocol is the multiplicative group Z p of integers modulo a prime p. The DH protocol can be described as following:
for the unknown a. If p is a very large prime of at least 300 digits, and a and b are at least 100 digits long, then the problem becomes computationally hard (exponential time in log p), and it is considered infeasible. For maximum security p should be a safeprime, i.e. (p − 1)/2 is also a prime, and g a primitive root of p [3] . An important short coming of traditional public key cryptosystems is the computation with very large numbers and prime numbers ( 300 digit), which is difficult and not very efficient. For similar key sizes, the DH method has a similar key strength as the mathematically related RSA method [4] , which is based on the hard integer factorization problem. Currently, no classical algorithm that can factor large numbers efficiently is known, which makes the RSA and the DH methods, widely used cryptographic protocols. However, this problem can be solved on a quantum computer in polynomial time using Shor's algorithm [5] . Therefore, the current public key cryptographic protocols are insecure if sufficiently large quantum computers become available, putting many sensitive systems like e-commerce and Internet banking at risk. This is why there is an ongoing search for other methods, where similar key exchange mechanisms can be implemented more efficiently, and are immune to quantum algorithms attacks.
Here, we propose a new public key cryptosystem based on strings only, which avoids the traditional number theory approach. The security of the proposed cryptosystem is ensured by a recursive encoding mechanism embedded in a quasi-commutative-random function, which is a composition of a quasi-commutative function with a pseudo-random function. Due to the inherent construction algorithm of the the proposed cryptosystem, the resulted mathematical inversion problem is likely to be harder than the classical discrete logarithm or integer factorization problems. Also, as a direct consequence of the string based approach, attacks based on existing quantum algorithms cannot be used against the proposed cryptosystem.
Quasi-commutative transformation
Let us consider the following set:
where the total number of elements is even. For example, if the intention is to build a crytosystem based on strings where the characters α ∈ Ω are representable on a byte word (8 bits), then one can consider p = 2 8 = 256. However, we should emphasize that this choice is not a restriction, and the results obtained here are valid for any even integer p = 2n. Thus, we assume that any element:
is a string of length N defined over the set Ω. A function F : Ω × Ω → Ω is said to be quasi-commutative if for any ξ, α, β ∈ Ω we have [6] :
For example, the function used in both DH and RSA algorithms:
is quasi-commutative, because:
Here we consider the function G w : Ω × Ω → Ω defined as:
The function G w is quasi-commutative, since we have: 
where we have omitted mod p, in order to simplify the notation. The quasi-commutative property ensures that if one starts with an initial value ξ ∈ Ω and a set of values {α 0 , α 1 , ..., α N −1 } ∈ Ω N , then the result of the composition:
would not change if the order of the values α n were permuted [6] . We should note that if the parameter w is even, w = 2q, q ∈ N, then the function G w does not have fixed points. In order to prove this, let us consider the fixed point equation:
which is equivalent to
and
Since mp − 1 is odd, w must be also odd in order to have a solution of the above equation. For example, if w = 1 then ξ = (mp − 1) mod p = p − 1 is a solution of the fixed point equation.
Similarly, if w = 3, then ξ = p − 3 is a solution of the fixed point equation. However, if w is even, then the fixed point equation has no integer solutions. Thus, the parameter w in the function G w must be even, w = 2q, q ∈ N, in order to avoid a fixed point in repeated iterations.
Pseudo-random transformation
Let us now consider the following problem. Given a string "seed":
find a transformation R, that generates a non-repeating and pseudo-random sequence of strings, through a recursive application:
The transformation R can be for example a cryptographic hash function, which is considered impossible to invert, a random number generator, or a chaotic deterministic function. Here we prefer to use a secure cryptographic hash function, due to its ability to deal directly with input strings of any length. However, following a similar approach, one can also adapt a cryptographically secure random number generator (for example AES), or a chaotic deterministic function.
An ideal cryptographic hash function has the following properties: (a) it computes a hash value for any given string; (b) it is impossible to invert, i.e. to generate a string that has a given hash; (c) any change in the input string triggers a change in the hash value; (d) it is impossible to find two different strings with the same hash value. Therefore, a cryptographic hash function should provide a random transformation of the input string. Typical hash functions that can be used for the role of the R transformation are the standard SHA-1, SHA-2 and SHA-3 cryptographic hash functions, published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS).
Most cryptographic hash functions are designed to take a string of any length as input and produce a fixed-length hash string value. Here, we assume that the computed output hash string has a fixed length L > 0, such that:
4 The proposed cryptosystem
For any element ξ ∈ Ω and string s = {s 0 , s 1 , ..., s N −1 } ∈ Ω N we define the following recursive transformation:
where
According to the results from the previous sections, this transformation satisfies the quasi-commutative property. Also, we should note that from the algorithmic point of view, the transformation T can be calculated as following:
Let us now define a more complex transformation W , as a composition of T and R. For any two strings x = {x 0 , x 1 , ..., x K−1 } ∈ Ω K and s = {s 0 , s 1 , ..., s N −1 } ∈ Ω N we define:
with the components W k , k = 0, 1, ..., K − 1, given by:
satisfying the quasi-commutative property, since T is quasi-commutative. The whole transformation is also quasi-commutative, and algorithmically it can be computed as following:
An important aspect of the W function, is that each component x k of the input string x is encoded using a different strings obtained by recursively applying the pseudo-random cryptographic hash function R to the secret string s.
Since now all the necessary ingredients have been defined, the proposed key generation and exchange protocol can be formulated as following:
1. Alice and Bob agree upon the public string g = {g 0 , g 1 , ..., g K−1 } ∈ Ω K .
Alice chooses the secret string
3. Alice computes the string A = W (g, a) ∈ Ω K , and publishes A. Both Alice and Bob obtain the same secret key s = s A = s B , since W satisfies the quasicommutativity property:
The flow chart showing the above key generation and exchange protocol is given in Figure 1 . Also, the C code implementing the proposed key generation and exchange protocol, and a typical key exchange simulation example, are given in the Appendix.
The hard problem
Assuming that the eavesdropper Eve knows g, A and B the hard problem is to compute the strings a ∈ Ω N and respectively b ∈ Ω M . This is a hard problem, since even the length (N and M ) of the strings is kept secret by Alice and Bob, and the security is ensured by the above described recursive encoding mechanism embedded in the quasi-commutative-random function W , which is a composition of a quasi-commutative function T with a pseudo-random function R.
The encoding mechanism can also be described with the following recursive equations for the evolution of a and A k , k = 0, 1, ..., K − 1:
and respectively
with the unknowns a
L−1 . We should note that for each k = 0, 1, ..., K − 1, any permutationã (k) of a (k) is also a solution of the equation (24). Assuming that by chance Eve finds a solutionã (0) for the first equation, k = 0, which is in fact a permutation of a hash of a, then one may think that she may use the recursion equation (23) to findã (k) . This is not possible either, because the resultsã (k) obtained via R (k+1) are completely dependent on the order of the characters in the stringã (0) . Therefore, any permutationã (0) of a (0) will give a different resultã (k) . The recursion R (k+1) gives the correct result if and only ifã (0) ≡ a (0) . For these reasons the proposed cryptosystem hinders eavesdroppers from discovering the secret string keys a and respectively b.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented a new public key cryptosystem based on strings, which avoids the cumbersome key generation using the traditional number theory approach. The security mechanism for public and secret keys generation is ensured by a recursive encoding mechanism embedded in a quasi-commutative-random function, resulted from the composition of a quasi-commutative function with a pseudo-random function. The public and secret keys can be easily created and the encodingdecoding process can be performed very rapidly, with low memory requirements and computational power. Due to the inherent construction algorithm of the the proposed cryptosystem, the resulted mathematical inversion problem is likely to be harder than the classical discrete logarithm or integer factorization problems. Also, due to the string-based approach, attacks based on known quantum algorithms cannot be used against the proposed cryptosystem. 
